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JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (Supp. 1992).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR

IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR AN INEXPERIENCED SIXTEEN YEAR OLD
DRIVER IS THE SAME AS THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR AN EXPERIENCED ADULT
OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN

REFUSING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION

TO

EXCLUDE

DEFENDANT'S

EXPERT

ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION WITNESS DESPITE THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT
FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY CONVEY THE WITNESS' NAME
AND

ADDRESS

TO

PLAINTIFF

SEASONABLY

BEFORE

TRIAL,

DESPITE

A

CONTINUING INTERROGATORY REQUESTING THE NAMES OF EXPERT WITNESSES
AND A COURT ORDER TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH THE NAMES OF EXPERT
WITNESSES WELL BEFORE THE START OF TRIAL.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both issues are governed by the abuse of discretion standard.
See, e.g. Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985).

A

ruling by the trial court will be reversed under this standard if
1

it "'had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict. 1 "
Id., quoting In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1976).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

The following statutes and rules are determinative of the
question at issue in this appeal:
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401:
'Relevant evidence1 means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (b) (4):
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts,
otherwise
discoverable
under
the
provisions
of
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require
any other party to identify each person whom the
other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the
expert is expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the
2

expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (e):
A party who has responded to a request for discovery with
a response that was complete when made is under no duty
to supplement his response to include information
thereafter acquired, except as follows:
(1)
A party is under a duty seasonably to
supplement his response with respect to any
question directly addressed to (A) the identity and
location
of
persons
having
knowledge
of
discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each
person expected to be called as an expert witness
at trial, the subject matter on which he is
expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the court instruct the jury on the
law as set forth in said requests. The court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally or otherwise waive this requirement.
If the
instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to
the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the
instructions after they are given to the jury, but before
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to
the giving of an instruction, a party must state
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection.
Notwithstanding the foregoing
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or the
failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be
given to make objections, and they shall be made out of
the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall
not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact.
3

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff and appellant Stanley Summerill brought this action
in the Second Judicial District Court to recover compensation for
injuries he sustained as a result of a severe automobile collision.
(R. 1-4) The trial resulted in a jury determination that Defendant
Scott Shipley was not negligent in causing the collision.
212).

(R. 210-

On or about March 1, 1993, plaintiff made a Motion for New

Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 411-442).

On or about July 12, 1993, the trial court denied

plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial.

(R. 474-476).

July 28, 1993, plaintiff filed his notice of appeal.

On or about
(R. 477-481).

On or about November 19, 1993 the Supreme Court poured this matter
over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

Statement of Facts and Disposition

1.

On or about October 12, 1988, the vehicle driven by

plaintiff Stanley Summerill was struck by a vehicle owned by
defendant Stephen Shipley, and driven by defendant Scott Shipley,
a minor at the time of the collision.
2.
Summerill

(R. 2-4).

As a result of the collision of October 12, 1988, Mr.
suffered

serious

personal

injuries

which

hospitalization and extensive further medical care.

4

required

(R. 3-4).

3.

On or about September 9, 1991, plaintiff submitted, among

other questions, the following interrogatories to Defendant Scott
Shipley, pursuant to Rule 26 (b) (4) (a) (i) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure:
INTERROGATORY NO. 52: Have you or your representatives hired
any experts to determine the cause of the collision or to
reconstruct the collision?
INTERROGATORY NO. 53: If the answer to the preceding
Interrogatory is affirmative, state the name and address of
the expert whom you have hired for that purpose.
4.

Pursuant to court order, given in a pretrial conference

of October 6, 1992, (R. 765) plaintiff submitted a witness list to
defense counsel on or about October 30, 1992 (R. 74-78), which date
was approximately one month before the close of discovery.
5.
or

Defendants did not submit any witness list to plaintiff,

identify

expert witnesses with

any

reasonable

degree of

specificity, until at least December 18, 1992, two weeks after
discovery had closed

and approximately

beginning of the trial.

two weeks before the

(See Exhibit "A", a true copy of the

December 18, 1992 letter from defense counsel to plaintiff's
counsel.)

Even

acknowledges
defendants

that

in the

December

no witness

list had

been

counsel

sent, and

that

"may have Ron Probert testify about a few points

regarding the accident itself."
6.

18, 1992, defense

[Emphasis added].

Defendants did not specifically and unequivocally affirm

that they would call Mr. Probert as an expert witness, and provide
his address, until the Pre-Trial Order dated December 31, 1992,
four days before the start of the trial. (R. 262.)
5

7.

Because of defendants' failure to specifically inform

plaintiff of his expert accident reconstructionist witness in
sufficient time to allow plaintiff to conduct discovery as to him,
plaintiff made a written Motion In Limine Re: Exclusion of Expert
Witnesses at the commencement of the trial of this action, seeking
for the court to sanction defendants for their failure to provide
the name and address of their proposed experts in answer to
plaintiff's interrogatory, and also for their failure to comply
with the court's order that the parties exchange expert witness
lists.

(R. 249-255).

8.

After some argument in chambers, this court denied

plaintiff's Motion In Limine Re: Exclusion of Expert Witnesses, and
allowed defendant to present expert testimony from Ronald Probert,
basing its decision, at least in part, on the court's "notes from
the pretrial [of October 6, 1992] ... that the defendant indicated
at

that

time

that

reconstructionist."
9.

Mr.

Probert

would

be

the

accident

(R. 662).

The transcript of the pretrial which the court referred

to indicates that, in response to a question from the court as to
what experts the defense had considered for trial, defense counsel
stated

that

"I

reconstructionist.
[Emphasis added].
10.

think

we

will

probably

use

an

accident

I have talked to Mr. Ron Probert about that."
(R. 763).

At the pretrial conference of October 6, 1992, the court

clearly issued an order for "a list of witnesses to be exchanged
between you two by the —

you should know that by November 2nd so
6

that there is no surprise."

[Emphasis added].

(R. 765). As noted

above, plaintiff complied with this order, by submitting his
witness

list on or about October

30, 1992

(R. 74-78) , but

defendants failed to comply with the order.
Plaintiff had no opportunity to depose Mr. Probert or conduct
any discovery as to his theories or findings.

It is undisputed

that defendants did not notify plaintiff, unequivocally and in
writing, prior to the close of discovery, of their definite intent
to call Mr. Probert.

Further, Mr. Probert did not prepare a

written report of his conclusions, so plaintiff had no opportunity
to prepare for Mr. Probert's testimony, or to adequately prepare
for cross-examination.
11.

At trial, in opening and closing statement and through

testimony of his expert accident reconstructionist, defense counsel
made a torrent of arguments to the jury that the jurors should
judge the driving conduct of the 16-year-old defendant as conduct
appropriate and reasonable for a new, inexperienced, 16-year-old
driver.

Defense

counsel

argued,

and

defendants1

accident

reconstruction expert stated, that the jury should not hold the
young defendant to as high a standard of care in the operation of
a motor vehicle as that to which they might hold other, more
experienced drivers.

(See,

e.g. R. 672, "[y]ou are going to have

to conclude whether or not what Scott Shipley did at the time of
this

accident

was properly

driving

or

inappropriate

driving

considering his age and his driving experience. He was a 16-yearold driver at the time.

Many of you have children or have had
7

children who were 16-year-old drivers and you know what that's
like" and R.675, the road was "unexpectedly very slick, especially
for a young 16-year-old driver" and R. 677 "[a] young driver.•.he's
turning into it trying to correct it as best he can" and R. 590,
"[y]ou have to try to project yourself into his situation, back
when you were 16 years old, just learning how to drive and you are
in a similarly dangerous situation, unexpected, you cope with it as
best you can" and R. 591, "it just happens out on those roads and
you're all older, more experienced drivers and so you can cope with
that...")
12.

Defendant's

collision

reconstruction

expert,

Ronald

Probert, offered his expert opinion which was identical to the
theory argued by defense counsel, which was that an inexperienced
driver has a lesser duty of care, and thus, that the careless
actions of the 16 year old defendant were not negligent.
523,

(See R.

"[w]hat I think he did wrong, I think he is a young

inexperienced driver...".)
13.

Because of the consistent, repeated arguments by defense

counsel that the inexperienced 16-year-old defendant driver had a
lower duty of care than other drivers, together with the supporting
evidence from the defense expert, plaintiff's counsel requested an
instruction to clarify the true state of the law, which instruction
stated:
A minor engaging in an adult activity, that is, an
activity which is normally performed by adults and which
requires a higher degree of maturity and judgment than
activities minors would normally engage in, is held to
the same standard of care as an adult engaging in that
activity.
8

After argument, the court denied this jury instruction. Plaintiff
clearly and specifically objected to the court's denial of his
requested instruction prior to the court's instructing the jury, as
required by Rule 51.
14.

(R. 615-616, 634-635)

The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action.

It

responded "No" to the first special verdict interrogatory, which
asked whether defendant was negligent in causing the collision.
15.

Plaintiff made a Motion for New Trial based on the trial

court's failure to instruct the jury pursuant to plaintiff's
requested

instruction cited above, and the court's denial of

plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Mr. Probert's testimony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks the reversal of the trial court's erroneous
rulings and its abuse of discretion in refusing to instruct the
jury fully on plaintiff's theory to avoid confusion and in refusing
to grant plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude surprise expert
witnesses.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court abused its discretion to plaintiff's

substantial prejudice in failing to give the instruction requested
by plaintiff on the standard of care for a minor operating a motor
vehicle. This abuse of discretion had a substantial impact on the
verdict, and requires reversal.
II.

The trial court abused its discretion to plaintiff's

substantial prejudice by failing to exclude defendants' expert

9

accident reconstructionist, Ronald Probert.

Plaintiff was not

notified, in writing, of defendants1 intent to call Mr. Probert,
until approximately two weeks before trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AND
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR, IN FAILING TO OFFER
THE CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF
REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR A YOUNG
INEXPERIENCED DRIVER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE

Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in
pertinent part, that "any party may file written requests that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said requests."
In the instant case, plaintiff submitted a written requested
instruction, as set out in the fact section, paragraph 13, above,
requesting the court to instruct the jury that a minor, when
engaged in an adult activity such as driving a motor vehicle, is
held to the same standard of care as an experienced adult driver.
The instruction requested by plaintiff was acknowledged by the
court as a correct statement of the law.

(R. 616). Nevertheless,

the court denied the proffered instruction, despite the fact that
a consistent and oft-repeated theme in defendants1 case was that
Defendant Scott Shipley was an inexperienced, 16 year old driver,
and that the jury should judge him by a lower standard of care than
would be applicable to more experienced drivers.

(See, e.g. R.

672, "[y]ou are going to have to conclude whether or not what Scott
Shipley did at the time of this accident was properly driving or
10

inappropriate

driving

considering

his

age

and

his

driving

experience. He was a 16-year-old driver at the time. Many of you
have children or have had children who were 16-year-old drivers and
you know what that's like" and R.675, the road was "unexpectedly
very slick, especially for a young 16-year-old driver" and R. 677
11

ta] young driver. . .he's turning into it trying to correct it as

best he can" and R. 590, "[y]ou have to try to project yourself
into his situation, back when you were 16 years old, just learning
how to drive and you are in a similarly dangerous situation,
unexpected, you cope with it as best you can" and R. 591, "it just
happens out on those roads and you're all older, more experienced
drivers and so you can cope with that...")
The trial court's abuse of its discretion in denying the
requested instruction is sufficient error to warrant a new trial
where, as here, the requesting party is substantially prejudiced by
the failure to give the instruction which correctly states the law.
This Court has stated that "[f]ailure to give requested jury
instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission
tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party
or erroneously advises the jury on the law."

Biswell v. Duncan,

742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987), accord In re Estate of Kesler,
702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985) and Jorcrensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82
(Utah App. 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right of a litigant
to "have his theory of the case presented in such a way as to aid
the jury and not confuse it." Morrison v. Perry. 140 P.2d 772, 778
11

(Utah 1943) .

In the context of the torrent of erroneous and

misleading argument offered by defense counsel on this subject,
coupled with incorrect statement of law in the evidence, from
defendants' reconstruction expert, who concluded that Defendant
Scott Shipley was not negligent, in part because "he is a young
inexperienced

driver"

(R. 523), the instruction requested by

plaintiff was essential to clarify the true state of the law. The
theory espoused by defendants is not a correct statement of the
law, and its repeated assertion by defense counsel and his expert,
without

correction

from

the

court,

confused

the

jury

and

constituted error.
This clear error was compounded by the jury instructions when
taken as a whole, as they must be for purposes of a challenge to
the failure to give a requested instruction.

See, e.g. Biswell v.

Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987). It is true that a number
of

the

instructions

particularly

regarding

instructions

numbers

general
23-24

duties
and

of

drivers,

28, make

broad

statements to the effect that "it is the duty of every driver to
use reasonable care" (see R. 173-174, 179), which could arguably be
interpreted, despite the repeated arguments of defendants1 counsel
and expert to the contrary, to include minor drivers such as the
defendant here.

Contrasting with these instructions, and leading

to a morass of confusion, are the instructions which seem to allow
the

jury

to

decrease

the

reasonableness and negligence.

16-year-old

driver's

duty

of

Such instruction allowed the jury

to determine "what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do
12

in a similar situation" (R. 164) , and instructed the jury that "the
amount of care that is considered
situation."

'reasonable1 depends on the

(R. 165).

When read as a whole, in light of the erroneous arguments of
counsel and the misleading conclusions of defendants' expert, the
instructions seem to lead naturally to the conclusion that a young,
inexperienced 16-year-old driver is behaving reasonably when he
enters a curve on a slippery road (which he arguably did not
realize were slippery because of his inexperience) at 40 miles per
hour (which he arguably believed was a reasonable speed because he
had been taught to accelerate on the freeway merging ramp), loses
control, overcorrects

(which he arguably did because of his

inexperience) and causes a collision, because he handled the
situation much as another young, inexperienced driver might have
done.

This conclusion is not a correct statement of the law, and

when the instructions seem to offer direct support for defendants'
incorrect

arguments

and

evidence

in

this

manner,

there

is

substantial prejudice to the plaintiff which must be remedied by a
new trial.
In a somewhat analogous situation, wherein the plaintiff
requested a separate, clarifying instruction stating that the
standard of care when dealing with children is higher than that
used when dealing with adults, the Colorado Court of Appeals
approved the giving of the additional, illuminating instruction.
Zimmer v. Celebrities, Inc., 615 P.2d 76, 80 (Colo App. 1980).
Despite defendant's argument that it was error to give the jury two
13

instructions

regarding

the

standard

of

care,

and

that

the

instructions were repetitive and potentially misleading, the Zimmer
court held that n[t]he second instruction accurately paraphrased
C.J.I. 9:7 in part and went on to provide the 'further definition1
of reasonable care as to children under the case law of Colorado."
Id. The instruction requested by the plaintiff, and refused by the
trial court in this case, was directly analogous to the proffered
instruction in Zimmer —

it was meant to clarify the somewhat

confusing issue of standard of care where there is a minor, just
learning to drive, who accepts the responsibility of operating a
motor vehicle on public roads.

With this right must come the

burden of being held to the standard of care of one who has
reasonable training and experience with road conditions and vehicle
control.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that ff[t]he purpose of jury
instructions is to inform the jury of applicable law in terms that
they can readily understand.

They should be concise and clear in

meaning and in lay people's language and not contain belabored
legal definitions.11

[Emphasis added]. Penelko, Inc. v. John Price

Associates, Inc.. 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1982). Where, as here,
the jury instructions leave an ambiguity as to whether the jury is
to assess the defendant's conduct according to the standard of an
experienced, seasoned driver or according to a similarly placed 16year-old new driver, the instructions have failed in this basic
purpose, recognized by the Supreme Court as essential to proper

14

instructions.

The trial court's failure to rectify this confusion

was error, which must be remedied by a remand for a new trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that
The confusion created by [ambiguous] . . . instructions may
well have denied [plaintiff] a fair trial.
'What the
party is entitled to is a presentation of the case to the
jury under instructions that clearly, concisely and
accurately state the issues and the law applicable
thereto so that the jury will understand its duties. '
Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274-275
(Utah 1992), quoting Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8,
12, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (1960) •
Here, the right recognized by the Court has been denied, by a
combination

of

defense

counsel's

artful

argument, defendants'

expert's legally erroneous conclusions and the ambiguous, often
simply misleading, jury instructions which were not clarified as
requested by plaintiff.
Plaintiff is entitled to a trial by a fully and correctly
informed jury. The failure of the trial court to offer plaintiff's
requested instruction, which correctly stated the nuances of the
law to be applied to the facts, was reversible error.

This Court

should remand for a new trial with appropriate instruction in this
regard.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING
TO SANCTION DEFENDANTS FOR THEIR FAILURE TO
UNEQUIVOCALLY INFORM PLAINTIFF OF THEIR INTENDED
EXPERTS IN A TIMELY FASHION, AS REQUIRED BY THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND COURT ORDER
Defendants

first

notified

plaintiff

in

writing

of

the

possibility that they would call Mr. Probert as an expert witness
on December 18, 1992, more than two weeks after this court had
15

ordered discovery closed and only sixteen days before trial,
Exhibit

"A".)

Plaintiff

was precluded

from

conducting

(See
any

discovery as to this expert, whose testimony, apparently believed
wholeheartedly by the jury, was fatal to plaintiff's case. In the
same letter, defense counsel refers to the close of discovery which
had already passed. Thus, at the time of this notification he was
aware it was too late for plaintiff to conduct further discovery.
Defendants1 tardy notification left plaintiff no opportunity
to probe the findings and the expected testimony of this expert
prior

to

trial.

Plaintiff

first

confronted

him

when

the

defendants' offered him as an expert accident reconstructionist at
trial. Plaintiff had no opportunity to prepare for this testimony,
particularly since Mr. Probert prepared no report of his findings.
Defendants cleverly waited until after the close of discovery
to definitively notify plaintiff of their expert witnesses.

This

court should not condone tactics of "trial by ambush and surprise."
Here defendants gained a distinct tactical advantage by presenting
witnesses whose findings, opinions and conclusions were unknown to
plaintiff.
A. Defendants Obtained an Unfair Tactical Advantage by Violating
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and by Disobeying
a Court Order to Provide the Names of Their Experts
Defendants' tactical advantage was obtained by violating the
Rules of Civil Procedure and by disobeying a court order that they
provide the names of their expert witnesses. Such unjust advantage
should not be countenanced.

16

Plaintiff inquired of Defendant Scott Shipley, by means of
interrogatories early in the discovery of this action, whether "you
or your representatives hired any experts to determine the cause of
or to reconstruct the collision" and, if so, to "state the name and
address of the expert whom you have hired for this purpose."
Plaintiff had a right to this information, pursuant to Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore,
defendants had a duty to supplement this information pursuant to
Rule 26(e)(1). Defendants made no such supplementation until after
the expiration of plaintiff's time to conduct further discovery as
to these experts.
Additionally, the trial court ordered, at the October 6, 1992
pretrial conference, that the parties exchange witness lists.
Although this order was apparently never memorialized in writing,
the fact remains that it was ordered, and that plaintiff was able
to comply.

Even after receiving plaintiff's witness list, which

should have triggered defendants1 recollection of the order, they
did not submit any notification of their intended expert witnesses
until after the close of discovery. It is interesting that defense
counsel

can

vividly

remember

that

portion

of

the

pretrial

conference in which he gave an informal, non-committal statement of
who he might call as an expert, yet he was unable to recall the
court's clear and specific order to exchange witness lists, even
after he received plaintiff's list in compliance with this order.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in general comments on the
purpose and uses of the discovery rules of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, that
Their purpose is to make procedure as simple and
efficient as possible by eliminating any useless ritual,
undue rigidities or technicalities which may have become
engrafted in our law; and to remove elements of surprise
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine
the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and
expeditiously as possible. [Emphasis added]. Ellis v.
Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967).
Further, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he idea of making a
lawsuit a game of tricks by keeping information secret to surprise
the opposition

at a critical moment

is more

suited

to the

fictionalized drama of stories and plays than to actual trials in
a court of justice."

State ex rel Road Commission v. Petty, 412

P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1966).

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has

stated similar concerns, holding that "[t]he rules for discovery
here involved were designed to eliminate, as far as possible,
concealment and surprise in the trial of law suits".

Evtush v.

Hudson Bus Transp. Co., 81 A.2d 6, 9, 27 A.L.R.2d 731 (New Jersey
1951).
Other

jurisdictions,

in

interpreting

similar

rules

requirements of notification to opponents of proposed

and

expert

witnesses in a timely fashion, have held that timely notice is
essential, and preclusion of testimony from the surprise witness is
a just and acceptable sanction for failure to follow the rules.
The Court of Appeals of Hawaii, for example, has repeatedly held
that "Rule 18(a)(1) of the Rules of the Circuit Court [an analogous
discovery rule] must be scrupulously followed if we are to have
18

fair trials."

[Emphasis added.]

Boudreau v. General Elec. Co.,

625 P.2d 384, 389 (Hawaii App. 1981).
As to the length of time between the time defendants clearly
and in writing notified the plaintiff of their intent to call Mr.
Probert and the trial, the two week period is not adequate to
alleviate the substantial prejudice to plaintiff.

On similar

facts, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in ruling on the exclusion of a
proffered witness who was not identified until three weeks before
trial, stated that "[t]hree weeks, while not the eve of trial, is
a relatively short period when contrasted with the long period
discovery had then taken."

Sullivan v. Chicago & Northwestern

Transp.. 326 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Iowa 1982).

Here, the short time

before trial is compounded by the fact that discovery had closed,
and so plaintiff had no opportunity to depose the witness or
otherwise prepare for his testimony.
Likewise, on the issue of whether the oral "notice" at the
pretrial conference of defendants1 consideration of Mr. Probert as
a possible expert, the Supreme Court of Texas, in interpreting that
state's local rules, which, admittedly, are more direct and more
harsh than those at issue here, has stated that:
[identification of witnesses in response to discovery
must be in writing; oral notice is not proper. This
avoids the inevitable disputes over who said what when.
The fact that a witness1 identity is known to all parties
is not itself good cause for failing to supplement
discovery. A party is entitled to prepare for trial
assured that a witness will not be called because
opposing counsel has not identified him or her in
response to a proper interrogatory. [Emphasis added.]
Sharp v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex
1990).
19

Similarly, authorities and commentators assessing the federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (upon which Utah's rules are based) and
similar state court rules, have stated that, where a party has
failed to comply with duties to seasonably and clearly provide
notice of expert witnesses, the sanction of preclusion of that
expert's testimony is called for.
Law —

See, e.g. Developments in the

Discovery 74 Harvard Law Review 940, 962 ("If it is assumed

that the duty to answer interrogatories is a continuing one, the
logical sanction for a breach would appear to be a refusal to allow
the recusant party to introduce the surprise testimony at the
trial.") and Comment, Exclusion of Witness's Testimony Where
Witness Is Not Disclosed on An Interrogatory, 1964 Illinois Law
Forum 456, 457 (1964), ("The answer to the argument that exclusion
of testimony frustrates the basic policy of the trial procedure
rests in the fact that compliance with discovery rules will best
effectuate the policy of presentment of all available truth before
the trier of fact, and adequate sanctions are necessary to enforce
compliance."

[Emphasis added, citations omitted.] and 23 Am. Jur.

2d Depositions and Discovery

§ 70

("The

responding party is

obligated to identify its expert witnesses explicitly, even if the
witness was previously identified as a person having knowledge of
discoverable matter.")
To allow defendants to benefit by their unjustified failure to
comply with clear discovery rules and orders, to plaintiff's
substantial prejudice, is to allow defendants to obtain advantages
by unfair and unjust strategy.
20

The further effect of such

strategies, and the tacit acceptance of them by the courts, is to
weaken

the Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

and

regularity and order established thereon.

the

assurances

of

Because of defendants'

failure to specifically inform plaintiff of the expert witness they
intended to call, and to supplement their responses to plaintiff's
interrogatories in sufficient time to allow plaintiff to conduct
trial discovery, plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to
reverse and remand for a new trial.
CONCLUSION

This court should properly reverse the trial court's erroneous
rulings, and remand for a new trial, because:

1.

Plaintiff requested a jury instruction which specifically

stated the correct standard of care for minors engaging in adult
activities, such as driving an automobile.
requested

instruction,

despite

the

This court denied the

fact that

the

thrust of

defendants' argument, and opinions offered by their expert, focused
on the theme that Defendant Scott Shipley was a 16 year old driver,
and that the jury should judge his actions by a lower standard than
that applied to experienced drivers; and

2.

The trial court should have granted plaintiff's Motion In

Limine re: Exclusion of Expert Witnesses, as plaintiff had no
opportunity to depose or otherwise prepare to address the surprise
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testimony of defendants' expert witnesses, and he was severely
prejudiced thereby.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J

day of January, 1994.

SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

5
John Farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
Attorneys for the plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this

]^

day of

January, 1994, two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were
mailed, postage fully prepaid, to:
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Ralph Dickey
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December 18, 1992

FAX (801) 532-5506

VIA TELEFAX NO, 266-1338
Ned P. Siegfried
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Re:

Summerill
v.
Shipley
Our File No. 6016-1074

Dear Ned:
I wanted to touch base with you on a few outstanding
discovery issues. First, last time we talked you had asked me for my
witness list. I noted that I was surprised that we had not sent one
to you if the court had ordered one. Upon checking, I found that the
reason we had not sent it to you was because the courts Scheduling
Order made no reference to it, so it was never docketed in our
office. However, I certainly do not intend to try to hide who my
witnesses will be. As I stated before, I believe that you know who
all those witnesses are. In addition to some of the treating
physicians or other witnesses listed on your witness list, we intend
to call Dr. Nord, who performed the IME, I intend to use my client's
deposition as we stipulated, and I* may*"have Ron Probert testify about
a few points regarding the accident itself.
As to your last set of written discovery, it fell due
following the discovery cut-off date, but because we have worked well
in cooperating on this case so far, I suppose that I will voluntarily
give you some of that information any way. However, for the most ^ ^_
part, I intendedj^to^object^to your -requests vf ort. inf oraation va^to^oiir
experts/' I "will" give^you la 'definite"response within*the* next couple
of days.
Finally, as to the outstanding discovery that each of us
owes the other from early in the case, I have written responses from
my client which I am willing to give to you, assuming that you will
return the favor and give me your client's responses. I will
stipulate that my client's written responses are in fact his and can
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be treated as such in this case, but of course, I will not be able to
get a signature from my client because he is in Portugal. Also, I
should note that nearly all of the questions that you posed were
handled in the deposition of my client that was just recently taken.
If you want to discuss any of these matters, please give me
a call.
Sincerely,
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
&»NELSON

in S. Davies
LSD/pm
Summer9. opp

